self_update provides updaters for updating rust executables in-place from various release
distribution backends.
Supported backends: GitHub, GitLab, Gitea, Gitee, S3 (Amazon S3, Google GCS,
DigitalOcean Spaces, or any S3-compatible endpoint), and Manifest (any static file server).
The forge and S3 backends each expose a ReleaseList builder alongside the Update
(configure -> build -> update) API; the manifest backend exposes Update only.
use self_update::cargo_crate_version;
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let status = self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("github")
.show_download_progress(true)
.current_version(cargo_crate_version!())
.build()?
.update()?;
println!("Update status: `{}`!", status.version());
Ok(())
}Upgrading from 0.x? 1.0 makes a focused set of breaking changes to clean up the public API. See the 1.0 migration guide for a step-by-step walkthrough, or the agent-oriented guide for automated migration tooling.
Running unattended (daemon / CI / service)? The defaults are interactive:
show_outputistrueandno_confirmisfalse, soupdate()prints a release-status block to stdout and then blocks on an interactiveyes/noprompt waiting on stdin. With no terminal attached this stalls (or aborts). For any non-interactive caller set.no_confirm(true)to skip the prompt, and usually.show_output(false)to silence the status block. These are settings only -- the defaults are unchanged. Note the status block is printed before the confirmation prompt, so suppressing one does not suppress the other.
At least one HTTP client must be selected. A build with no client -- for example
default-features = false with only a TLS feature such as features = ["rustls"] -- fails to
compile with no HTTP client selected - enable at least one of the reqwest (default) or ureq features. Add a client explicitly, e.g. default-features = false, features = ["ureq", "rustls", "github"]. Multiple clients and multiple TLS backends may coexist (reqwest is preferred when both
are present):
reqwest(default): use thereqwestHTTP client;ureq: use theureqHTTP client, either alongside reqwest or as a drop-in replacement (setdefault-features = falseto drop reqwest);rustls(default): pure-Rust TLS; does not support 32-bit macOS;native-tls: opt-in native/OpenSSL TLS for the selected client;native-tls-vendored: build OpenSSL from source and link it statically (for targets where a usable system OpenSSL is awkward, e.g. musl or some cross-compiles); impliesnative-tls, applies to the reqwest client;
Note that enabling a client with neither TLS feature compiles (plain-http release hosts remain
reachable) but any https URL then fails at request time with a transport error; enable rustls
or native-tls for https.
The following cargo features are enabled by default:
github: the GitHub Releases backend;progress-bar: terminal download progress bar;
The following are opt-in; activate the one(s) your release files need:
gitlab: the GitLab Releases backend;gitea: the Gitea Releases backend;gitee: the Gitee Releases backend;s3: the S3-compatible backend (Amazon S3, GCS, DigitalOcean Spaces, etc.);s3-auth: sign S3 requests (AWS SigV4) for private buckets; impliess3;manifest: the static-file manifest backend; fetches releases from amanifest.jsonserved by any HTTP endpoint; no new dependencies;archive-tar: support for tar archive format;archive-zip: support for zip archive format;compression-tar-gz: support for gzip compression (.tar.gz,.tgz, plain.gz);compression-tar-xz: support for xz compression (.tar.xz,.txz, plain.xz); pure-Rust, no Cliblzmadependency;compression-zip-deflate: support for zip's deflate compression format;compression-zip-bzip2: support for zip's bzip2 compression format;signatures: use zipsign to verify.zipand.tar.gzartifacts. Artifacts are assumed to have been signed using zipsign;checksums: verify a downloaded artifact against a SHA-256/SHA-512 checksum before installing it -- automatically against the digest github publishes per release asset, and/or against a known checksum you pass in (e.g. from aSHA256SUMSfile); see Checksum verification below;async: add async (*_async) update methods alongside the unchanged blocking API; tokio-only, requiresreqwest(ureq and reqwest can coexist -- reqwest serves the async path, and the sync API prefers reqwest when both are present); see Async below.
github is the only backend in the default feature set. The S3 backend requires the s3 feature; s3-auth implies s3. gitlab, gitea, gitee, and manifest each require their own feature.
Run the following example to see self_update in action:
cargo run --example github --features "signatures archive-tar compression-tar-gz".
There are equivalent examples for the other backends (gitlab, gitea, gitee, s3), e.g.:
cargo run --example gitlab --features "gitlab archive-tar compression-tar-gz".
Amazon S3, Google GCS, and DigitalOcean Spaces, as well as any S3 compatible server are also supported
through the S3 backend to check for new releases. Provided a bucket_name
and asset_prefix string, self_update will look up all matching files using the following format
as a convention for the filenames: [directory/]<asset name>-<semver>-<platform/target>.<extension>.
Leading directories will be stripped from the file name allowing the use of subdirectories in the S3 bucket,
and any file not matching the format, or not matching the provided prefix string, will be ignored.
use self_update::cargo_crate_version;
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn ::std::error::Error>> {
let status = self_update::backends::s3::Update::configure()
// .endpoint(self_update::backends::s3::Endpoint::GCS)
// .endpoint("https://s3.example.com")
.bucket_name("self_update_releases")
.asset_prefix("something/self_update")
.region("eu-west-2")
.bin_name("self_update_example")
// To authenticate (requires the `s3-auth` feature), read the credentials at
// runtime rather than baking them into the binary with `env!`:
// .access_key((std::env::var("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID")?, std::env::var("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY")?))
.show_download_progress(true)
.current_version(cargo_crate_version!())
.build()?
.update()?;
println!("S3 Update status: `{}`!", status.version());
Ok(())
}The manifest backend (manifest feature) serves releases from a manifest.json file hosted
on any static file server. The tool author publishes the manifest at a stable URL; assets may be
absolute URLs or relative paths resolved against that URL. Asset digest fields (sha256:<hex>)
plug into the existing checksum verification path when the checksums feature is on. See
specs/ref-manifest-backend.md for the full schema.
use self_update::cargo_crate_version;
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let status = self_update::backends::manifest::Update::configure()
.manifest_url("https://example.net/releases/manifest.json")
.bin_name("app")
.current_version(cargo_crate_version!())
.build()?
.update()?;
println!("Manifest update status: `{}`!", status.version());
Ok(())
}Separate utilities are also exposed (NOTE: the following example extracts a .tar.gz, which
requires both the archive-tar and compression-tar-gz features -- archive-tar reads the tar
archive and compression-tar-gz decodes the gzip layer; see the features section
above). It downloads, extracts, and replaces the running binary
by hand; the staging directory and the in-place replacement use the tempfile
and self_replace crates, which you add as your own dependencies
(they are no longer re-exported from self_update):
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let releases = self_update::backends::github::ReleaseList::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.build()?
.fetch()?;
println!("found releases:");
println!("{:#?}\n", releases);
// get the first available release (`fetch` returns a `Releases`; `latest()` is the first entry)
let latest = releases.latest().unwrap();
let asset = latest
.asset_for(&self_update::get_target(), None)
.unwrap();
let tmp_dir = tempfile::Builder::new()
.prefix("self_update")
.tempdir_in(::std::env::current_dir()?)?;
let tmp_tarball_path = tmp_dir.path().join(asset.name());
let tmp_tarball = ::std::fs::File::create(&tmp_tarball_path)?;
self_update::Download::from_url(asset.download_url())
.request_header(self_update::http::header::ACCEPT, "application/octet-stream")
.download_to(&tmp_tarball)?;
let bin_name = std::path::PathBuf::from("self_update_bin");
self_update::Extract::from_source(&tmp_tarball_path)
.archive(self_update::ArchiveKind::Tar(Some(self_update::Compression::Gz)))
.extract_file(&tmp_dir.path(), &bin_name)?;
let new_exe = tmp_dir.path().join(bin_name);
self_replace::self_replace(new_exe)?;
Ok(())
}The high-level update() flow replaces a single executable. To update a tool that ships more
than one file (a binary plus sidecar libraries/resources), or to install files that aren't the
running executable, download and extract the whole archive yourself and then install the files
with MoveAll, which applies a set of (source -> dest) moves transactionally: either every
move succeeds, or — on the first failure — all already-applied moves are rolled back, so a failed
update can't leave a half-installed tool. Because it uses rename (which can't cross
filesystems), the source files, every destination, and the temp dir must all be on the same
filesystem.
NOTE: this example extracts a .tar.gz, which requires both the archive-tar and
compression-tar-gz features.
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let tmp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new()?;
let tarball_path = tmp_dir.path().join("release.tar.gz");
// ... download the archive to `tarball_path` (see the example above) ...
// The extracted files are renamed into place, so the staging dir (the move sources) and the
// stash dir must be on the same filesystem as the destinations — create both next to them
// rather than in $TMPDIR. The `/usr/local` paths below are illustrative; use destinations
// and temp dirs you have write access to (these may require elevated privileges).
let staging = tempfile::TempDir::new_in("/usr/local")?;
self_update::Extract::from_source(&tarball_path)
.archive(self_update::ArchiveKind::Tar(Some(self_update::Compression::Gz)))
.extract_into(staging.path())?;
// Install several files atomically (all-or-nothing).
let stash = tempfile::TempDir::new_in("/usr/local")?;
self_update::MoveAll::from_temp(stash.path())
.add(staging.path().join("app"), "/usr/local/bin/app")
.add(staging.path().join("libapp.so"), "/usr/local/lib/libapp.so")
.commit()?;
Ok(())
}A macOS application is a directory bundle, so replacing only the executable inside
MyApp.app/Contents/MacOS/ leaves stale resources behind and breaks the bundle's code signature.
Set bundle_path_in_archive to name the bundle directory inside the release archive and the whole
tree is installed as one unit:
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("me")
.repo_name("myapp")
.bin_name("myapp")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
// The bundle directory inside the archive; `{{ bin }}` / `{{ target }}` / `{{ version }}`
// substitutions work here exactly as in `bin_path_in_archive`.
.bundle_path_in_archive("MyApp.app")
// Optional on macOS: defaults to the nearest `.app` ancestor of the running executable.
.bundle_install_path("/Applications/MyApp.app")
.build()?
.update()?;
Ok(())
}How the swap works, and what it guarantees:
- The archive is extracted in full into a temporary directory inside the install path's parent,
so every rename is on one filesystem (there is no cross-device fallback, and the parent needs
room for one more copy of the bundle). A symlinked
bundle_install_pathis resolved first, so the tree behind the link is replaced, the link survives, and staging still lands beside the real tree. - The installed tree is stashed, then the staged tree is renamed into place. A failure at any step restores the original bundle, and the error names the bundle path. Once the final rename lands the update is committed.
- When the running executable lives inside the bundle it is renamed aside first, so the old tree
holds no running image. After a successful update the running executable's path holds the new
bundle's executable, and the process can relaunch itself with
restart()(see Restarting after an update). - Bundle mode replaces a directory, so combining it with an explicit
bin_install_pathorbin_path_in_archiveis rejected bybuild()(Error::ConflictingConfig), and settingbundle_install_pathwithoutbundle_path_in_archiveis anError::MissingFieldrather than a silently discarded path.bin_nameis still required: it selects the asset and feeds{{ bin }}. - The
verify_binaryhook receives the staged bundle root, which is whatcodesign --verify --deepwants; a rejection aborts before anything is replaced. - The crate never signs, notarizes, or staples: ship an already-signed (and, for Gatekeeper,
notarized)
.appand the swap preserves exactly what you shipped. A quarantined app running from a read-only App Translocation mount cannot update itself in place; that is detected up front asError::AppTranslocated, and the fix is to move the app (which clears the quarantine) and relaunch it.
Directory bundles on linux and windows go through the same code path. On windows the swap fails,
and rolls back, if the process holds files inside the bundle open beyond its own executable (a DLL
loaded from the bundle, for example). .deb / .msi packages are a different shape entirely --
hand the downloaded file to dpkg -i / msiexec /i yourself; the crate's replace-and-verify
semantics do not apply to a system installer.
With the checksums feature, the crate verifies the downloaded artifact against a digest
before installing — a mismatch aborts the update. Two sources of digests, independently
applied (when both apply, both must pass):
- Release-published digests, automatic. GitHub publishes a
sha256:<hex>digest per release asset; the updater verifies the download against it whenever the selected asset carries one. This is on by default with thechecksumsfeature — no configuration needed — and can be disabled withverify_release_digest(false). The other backends' APIs publish no digest, so the check is a no-op there (a customReleaseSourcecan supply one viaReleaseAsset::with_digest). Note this is an integrity check only — the forge recomputes the digest if an asset is replaced — so it is not a substitute for thesignaturesfeature. - A known digest you pass explicitly (e.g. one published in a
SHA256SUMSfile alongside the release) viaverify_checksum. The algorithm is chosen by theChecksumvariant (Sha256/Sha512). - A digest resolved from a sums asset of the same release, via
checksum_from_asset("SHA256SUMS"). The named asset is fetched before the artifact is downloaded, and the entry for the selected asset supplies the digest. The usualSHA256SUMSshapes are accepted (coreutils text and binary modes, leading paths, the BSD tag form,#comments, and a whole-file bare digest), and the algorithm comes from the digest's length, so aSHA512SUMSasset needs no extra configuration. A release with no such asset, or no entry for the artifact, is anError::ChecksumSourceInvalidrather than a skipped check. This is the one to reach for on gitlab / gitea / s3, whose APIs publish no per-asset digest.
Both complement the signatures feature (zipsign), which verifies authenticity rather than a
published digest.
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("github")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
// hex digest, obtained out of band (e.g. parsed from the release's SHA256SUMS)
.verify_checksum(self_update::Checksum::Sha256("9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08".into()))
.build()?
.update()?;
Ok(())
}Or let the updater fetch and parse the release's own sums asset:
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("github")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
.checksum_from_asset("SHA256SUMS")
.build()?
.update()?;
Ok(())
}Two hooks let you gate an update with your own check. They differ in what file they see, which is the whole reason both exist:
verify_archive(|archive: &Path| ..)runs on the downloaded archive, after the crate's own content gates (checksum, release digest, signature) and before anything is extracted. This is where an external attestation or signature check belongs, since those are issued over the released file itself:gh attestation verify <archive> --repo owner/repo,cosign verify-blob, and so on. A rejection isError::ArchiveVerificationRejected.verify_binary(|new_exe: &Path| ..)runs on the extracted binary, immediately before it replaces the installed one. This is where a smoke test belongs, typically runningnew_exe --versionand checking the output. A rejection isError::VerificationRejected.
Either returning Err(..) aborts the update with nothing installed. Full order:
verify_checksum -> release digest -> signature -> verify_archive -> extract -> verify_binary
-> replace.
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("github")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
.verify_archive(|archive: &std::path::Path| {
let ok = std::process::Command::new("gh")
.args(["attestation", "verify"])
.arg(archive)
.args(["--repo", "jaemk/self_update"])
.status()
.map(|s| s.success())
.unwrap_or(false);
if ok {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(self_update::Error::archive_verification_rejected(
"no build-provenance attestation for this artifact",
))
}
})
.build()?
.update()?;
Ok(())
}To check whether a newer release exists without downloading or installing anything, call
is_update_available() on the built updater. It fetches the release listing and returns the newest
strictly-newer Release (or None when up to date):
fn check() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let update = self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("github")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
.build()?;
match update.is_update_available()? {
Some(release) => println!("update available: {}", release.version()),
None => println!("already up to date"),
}
Ok(())
}After update() returns VersionStatus::Updated the on-disk
executable has been replaced, but the running process keeps executing the old code until it exits.
To relaunch into the new binary immediately, use the restart module:
restart::restart() re-runs with the current arguments, and restart::restart_with(args) re-runs
with a fresh argument list (e.g. to drop an --upgrade flag so the new process does not update
again). On unix the process image is replaced with exec (the PID is preserved); on windows the new
binary is spawned and the current process exits. See the module docs for the platform details.
The crate never escalates privileges. There is no sudo re-exec, no polkit interaction, and no UAC prompt. Privilege escalation is always the caller's choice.
An install into an unwritable location fails with
Error::InstallPathNotWritable naming the path
(the configured bin_install_path). Any other IO failure at the install step surfaces as
Error::Io with a message naming the install path, so the path is
visible in the error regardless of the kind.
Setting check_install_path_writable(true) on the builder opts into a preflight probe that runs
immediately before the download. Only a definite PermissionDenied refusal errors early;
indeterminate results (a missing parent directory, an unusual filesystem) are treated as "proceed"
and let the real install step surface the outcome. The default is false.
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
match self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("owner")
.repo_name("repo")
.bin_name("app")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
.check_install_path_writable(true)
.build()?
.update()
{
Ok(status) => println!("updated: {}", status.version()),
Err(self_update::Error::InstallPathNotWritable { .. }) => {
// The install path is not writable by this process. Elevation is the
// application's choice: re-run under sudo, spawn a UAC-elevated child, etc.
// Use the `restart` module for the exec/spawn mechanics when relaunching
// with a modified argument list.
eprintln!("install path not writable; re-run with elevated privileges");
}
Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
}
Ok(())
}Every update() / is_update_available() call makes a network request. To avoid checking on every
run, gate the check behind UpdateCheckGuard, a small
stamp-file guard: should_check() reports whether the configured interval has elapsed since the
last recorded check, and record_check() stamps the current time. The caller owns the stamp-file
path. It is a guard, not a scheduler -- no threads or timers, and no extra dependencies. See the
check_interval module for the semantics.
Every forge backend's Update and ReleaseList builder -- github, gitlab, gitea, gitee, eight
builders in all -- takes an authorization token. A token is what reaches a private repository at
all, and what lifts the host's anonymous request budget (see
Rate limits and Error::RateLimited below). There are two
setters:
auth_token(t)-- a token your application already holds.auth_token_from_env()-- take it from the backend's conventional environment variables, using the first that is set and non-empty (surrounding whitespace is trimmed); a variable that is set but is not valid UTF-8 is treated the same as unset, since it could not become an HTTP header value either way:- github:
GH_TOKEN, thenGITHUB_TOKEN(matching theghCLI's documented precedence). - gitlab:
GITLAB_TOKEN. - gitea:
GITEA_TOKEN. - gitee:
GITEE_TOKEN.
- github:
The lookup happens when you call auth_token_from_env(), not at request time: it reads the process
environment exactly once, at that call. A std::env::set_var made afterward -- before build(),
before update() -- has no effect on an already-built value; call the setter again (or set the
variable earlier) if that ordering matters to you.
let status = self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("self_update_example")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
// Uses a token when the environment supplies one; unauthenticated when it does not.
.auth_token_from_env()
.build()?
.update()?;Precedence: an explicit auth_token(..) always wins, in either call order. The environment is a
fallback that only fills an unset token, so auth_token(t).auth_token_from_env() and
auth_token_from_env().auth_token(t) both end up with t, and an ambient *_TOKEN can never
displace the credential your application provisioned. When no variable is set the call is a no-op --
the token is left as it was and the request goes out exactly as before -- so it is safe to place
unconditionally in an application that also runs outside CI or a corporate network.
has_auth_token() (on the same eight builders) reports whether an authorization token is
configured on this builder, from either setter. This is configuration, not a prediction: at
request time the token is withheld unless the URL's host matches the configured API host or an
allow_auth_host entry over https (loopback is allowed over plain http, for a local mirror or a
test stub), and a user-supplied Authorization header via request_header takes precedence over
it, silently. On gitea an env-sourced token is additionally withheld unless the configured host was
acknowledged (below). None of that is reflected by has_auth_token() -- it reports presence only,
never validity and never the value -- the builders' Debug renders the token as "<token>", so
logging a builder does not leak an ambient CI credential.
Reading the environment is opt-in: the crate never does it on its own, since the configured API base can be a self-hosted host and sending a user's token there should be your decision. Two caveats to "safe to call unconditionally":
- A variable that is set but stale, expired, revoked, or scoped to a different resource makes the
request fail where an anonymous request against a public repository would have succeeded --
typically a generic
Error::Unauthorized, with nothing in the error naming the environment as the cause. If a working update check starts failing right after you addauth_token_from_env(), check the variable's value first. - A token that is picked up but cannot be encoded as an HTTP header value (a stray newline, for
example) is not caught by
build()-- it surfaces asError::InvalidAuthTokenat request time, and that error's message does not mention the environment either.
Both of the crate's own diagnostics about the token it picked up -- the "using the auth token from
$X" pickup and the off-host warning below -- are emitted via log::debug! / log::warn! only.
Neither prints anything on its own; they are invisible unless your application has installed a
log implementation (env_logger, tracing-log, etc.).
The variable set does not change with the host. A custom api_base_url / host -- GitHub
Enterprise, a self-hosted GitLab -- is still served by exactly the variables above, so an ambient
GITHUB_TOKEN is sent to whatever host the builder points at. When an env-sourced token is about to
be bound to a host other than the backend's canonical one (api.github.com, gitlab.com,
gitee.com), build() emits a log::warn! naming the host, and still sends the token -- on
github/gitlab/gitee this is a warning, not a block. If the off-canonical host is a deliberate GitHub
Enterprise / self-hosted GitLab target, either silence the warning by acknowledging the host with
allow_auth_host(..), or skip the environment lookup and set the token explicitly instead:
auth_token(std::env::var("GITLAB_TOKEN")?). Note also that gh reads GH_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN /
GITHUB_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN for a GitHub Enterprise host and this crate does not, so an enterprise
api_base_url still needs one of the variables above (or an explicit auth_token(..)).
gitea is the exception to warn-and-send. It is always self-hosted, so it has no canonical host
to compare an env-sourced token's destination against. Rather than send GITEA_TOKEN to whatever
host the application happens to be pointed at with no signal at all, gitea withholds the token
instead: the request goes out anonymous, build() still returns Ok, and a log::warn! names the
host and the same two remedies as above. Get it sent anyway by acknowledging the host, either with
allow_auth_host(host) or by setting the token explicitly with auth_token(..) (which always takes
precedence, on every backend).
GitHub answers 404, not 401 or 403, when a token cannot see a private repository -- it hides the
repository's existence rather than distinguishing "forbidden" from "not found". That 404 surfaces as
Error::NotFound, so a repository you can normally read looks
like it does not exist rather than like a permission problem; check the token's scope before
assuming a typo in the repo name. Reading a private repository's releases needs the classic repo
scope (a fine-grained token needs Contents: Read-only) -- the "no scopes needed" note below is for
lifting a public repository's rate limit only.
CI_JOB_TOKEN is deliberately not read on gitlab, even though every GitLab CI job exports it:
this backend sends Authorization: Bearer, which is not GitLab's job-token mechanism (the
JOB-TOKEN header / job_token parameter), and job tokens are project-scoped -- reading it would
turn a working anonymous fetch of a public project into a 401/403 inside CI. Pass it explicitly with
auth_token(..) if you want it.
A rate-limited response surfaces as Error::RateLimited,
distinct from the Error::Unauthorized a genuine credential failure produces -- the rule below is
the same on every backend, not just github (the numbers in GitHub rate
limits below are github-specific; the classification is not). A response with
headers in hand is classified as RateLimited when it is a 429 (RFC 6585 defines that status as
rate limiting, so it always lands here, with or without quota headers), or a 403 carrying either
a zero remaining-quota header (x-ratelimit-remaining: 0, or gitlab's RateLimit-Remaining: 0) or a
usable Retry-After -- that last case is GitHub's secondary rate limit, which answers 403 +
Retry-After while x-ratelimit-remaining is still nonzero. A bare 403 with no such header stays
Unauthorized.
Back off by Error::rate_limit_delay(), which resolves
the wait to an Option<Duration>: the server's Retry-After when it sent one, otherwise
reset_at minus now, and None when the window has already elapsed or nothing is known. Reading
the raw fields instead is the footgun -- on GitHub's primary limit only x-ratelimit-reset is
sent, so retry_after.unwrap_or_default() sleeps zero and burns more quota. Both server-supplied
values are clamped to a 24h ceiling; beyond it they resolve to None, so a hostile Retry-After
cannot park an update channel indefinitely -- but the wait can legitimately be up to that 24h
ceiling, so blocking a thread on it is rarely the right call for an interactive application (see the
example below).
The retry/backoff setters do not apply to a RateLimited response. Error::RateLimited is
never retried: the wait is the server's to dictate (Retry-After, or the reset header), and it can
be far longer than any backoff this crate would apply, so the error is returned immediately and the
decision to sleep, reschedule, or give up stays with the caller instead of being spent inside the
loop.
fn check() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let update = self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("self_update_example")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
.auth_token_from_env()
.build()?;
match update.update() {
Ok(status) => println!("update status: `{}`", status.version()),
Err(err @ self_update::Error::RateLimited { .. }) => {
// rate_limit_delay() can resolve to a wait as long as 24h, so blocking this thread on
// it is rarely the right call for an interactive app. Skip this run and let the next
// scheduled check (e.g. through `UpdateCheckGuard` above) try again, rather than
// sleeping here -- if you do want to block instead, sleep on `err.rate_limit_delay()`
// and retry `update.update()` yourself.
let _ = err.rate_limit_delay();
println!("rate limited; retrying on the next scheduled check");
}
Err(err) => return Err(err.into()),
}
Ok(())
}Requests to the GitHub REST API are rate limited by GitHub itself, not by this crate:
- Unauthenticated requests are limited to 60 per hour per source IP; authenticated
requests (a token via
auth_token/auth_token_from_env, see Authentication) get 5000 per hour. A token needs no scopes to raise the limit for a public repository (a private repository needs the scope noted above regardless of the limit). - That budget is counted per source IP, not per application. Behind a shared egress IP -- a NAT'd corporate network, a CI runner pool, a VPN exit -- it is pooled across everyone on that IP and can be spent entirely by other people, so a lightly-used application still sees 403s there.
- An update check costs one API request (the latest-release lookup, or one request per page of a paginated listing). The asset download itself is a CDN redirect and does not count against the core API limit.
- To avoid it: set a token, and check less often -- the
UpdateCheckGuardabove throttles how often you check.
Each built-in backend exposes a ReleaseList builder for fetching the list of available releases
without performing an update. There is no single unifying self_update::ReleaseList type:
every backend has its own, distinct ReleaseList (the fields and request shape differ per host),
so they are reached through their backend modules rather than re-exported at the crate root:
backends::github::ReleaseListbackends::gitlab::ReleaseListbackends::gitea::ReleaseListbackends::gitee::ReleaseListbackends::s3::ReleaseList
The manifest backend has no separate ReleaseList struct. Its ManifestSource is a
ReleaseSource implementation that can be used directly, or listing can be driven through the
inherent verbs (get_latest_release, get_newer_releases, is_update_available) on a built
manifest::Update.
The custom backend has no ReleaseList by design: listing is performed entirely by your
ReleaseSource (or AsyncReleaseSource) implementation, which already returns
Release values directly.
To update from a host the built-in backends (github, gitlab, gitea, gitee, s3, manifest) don't cover —
another forge, a private artifact registry, a plain HTTP directory — implement the
ReleaseSource trait and drive a full update through the backends::custom backend, which reuses
the crate's compare → select-asset → download → verify → extract → install flow. Only
get_releases (the fetch that says where releases come from) is required;
get_latest_release / get_release_version are derived from it by default and can be overridden
when the host has cheaper dedicated endpoints. You build Releases with Release::builder and
ReleaseAsset::new; the ReleaseUpdate trait stays sealed.
ReleaseSource is synchronous. For a natively-async source, implement AsyncReleaseSource
(the same fetches as async fn) and drive it through
backends::custom::AsyncUpdate + build_async(); to reuse a
Clone sync source from the async API, wrap it in
backends::custom::Blocking.
use self_update::{Release, ReleaseAsset, ReleaseSource, cargo_crate_version};
struct MyHost;
impl ReleaseSource for MyHost {
fn get_releases(&self) -> self_update::Result<Vec<Release>> {
Ok(vec![Release::builder()
.version("1.2.3")
.asset(ReleaseAsset::new("app-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz", "https://host/app.tar.gz"))
.build()?])
}
}
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let status = self_update::backends::custom::Update::configure()
.source(MyHost)
.bin_name("app")
.current_version(cargo_crate_version!())
.build()?
.update()?;
println!("custom backend update status: `{}`!", status.version());
Ok(())
}With the async feature, every built-in backend's Update builder gains a build_async() that
returns a distinct AsyncUpdate wrapper (one per backend). Its async (*_async) verbs —
update_async(), update_extended_async(), get_latest_release_async(),
get_newer_releases_async(), get_release_version_async(), and is_update_available_async() — are
inherent methods on that wrapper, so a tokio application can update without wrapping the
blocking calls in spawn_blocking and without importing any trait. Crucially, the AsyncUpdate
wrapper does not expose the blocking verbs: calling .update() on an async-built updater is a
compile error, so the old footgun of accidentally running a blocking update from an async context
is gone. The blocking API is unchanged; the async path is purely additive. It is tokio-only and
requires reqwest -- ureq and reqwest can coexist (reqwest serves the async path, and the sync
API prefers reqwest when both are present); the only invalid configuration is async without
reqwest. Network IO becomes async, and the extract/replace tail runs on
tokio::task::spawn_blocking so it does not block the executor.
async fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let status = self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("github")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
.build_async()?
.update_async()
.await?;
println!("Update status: `{}`!", status.version());
Ok(())
}The AsyncUpdate wrapper exposes only the *_async verbs; the blocking update() is not a method
on it, so accidentally calling it from async code does not compile. The following block is
compile_fail for exactly that reason — update is not a method on the async wrapper (this block
is intentionally not feature-gated: gating it behind cfg(feature = "async") would make it an empty,
successfully-compiling doctest in the crate's no-async test lanes, which a compile_fail block
must never do):
fn wont_compile() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let updater = self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("github")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
.build_async()?;
// `update()` is the BLOCKING verb; it is not exposed on the async `AsyncUpdate` wrapper.
updater.update()?;
Ok(())
}Both clients honor the HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY / NO_PROXY environment variables. When the
proxy requires credentials that you would rather not put in the environment, set it on the builder
instead — the URL may embed them, and they are sent to the proxy as Proxy-Authorization:
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("github")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
.proxy("http://corp-user:s3cret@proxy.corp.example:8080")
.build()?
.update()?;
Ok(())
}The proxy applies to every request the updater makes, the release listing and the asset download
alike, and Download has the same proxy setter for standalone downloads. The
password is redacted from the builder's Debug output and from any error it produces, so neither
leaks into your logs. An unparseable URL surfaces as
Error::InvalidProxy from build().
Only HTTP CONNECT proxies are supported (SOCKS is out of scope — inject your own client for that).
On the reqwest client this proxy is applied alongside the environment variables (reqwest tries its
configured proxies in order, first match wins); on a ureq-only build the agent has a single proxy
slot, so the configured proxy replaces the env-var one. A client injected via http_client /
reqwest_client / ureq_agent owns its own proxy configuration and ignores this setter.
The .timeout() / .request_header() / .retries() / .proxy() / .add_root_certificate()
builder knobs cover most transport needs, but for full control — mTLS, connection pooling, redirect
policy, SOCKS proxies, or simply reusing your application's existing client — you can hand the crate
a pre-built client.
It is used for both the release listing and the download. The client-specific convenience setters
are reqwest_client (a blocking reqwest::blocking::Client, used by the blocking API),
reqwest_async_client (an async reqwest::Client, used by the *_async verbs), and ureq_agent
(a ureq::Agent); each wraps your client behind the crate's object-safe HTTP transport trait. The
compiled client crate(s) are re-exported (self_update::reqwest / self_update::ureq) so you don't
need a separate dependency to name the type. (Since the transport is a runtime trait seam, reqwest
and ureq are no longer mutually exclusive — both can be enabled, and the sync API prefers reqwest
when both are present.) For test doubles or fully custom transport, inject any type that implements
the object-safe trait directly via .http_client(Arc<dyn HttpClient>) (sync) or
.http_client_async(Arc<dyn AsyncHttpClient>) (async); see the http_client
module for the trait definitions.
When you inject a client, .request_header() still applies, and .retries() still applies to the
release-listing requests and to the download's request-establishment phase (a mid-stream failure
is not retried, as that would corrupt the partially-written destination), and for reqwest the per-request
.timeout() is layered on too; but HTTP(S)_PROXY env and the crate's TLS feature are left entirely
to your client (and a ureq::Agent owns its own timeout, so .timeout() does not apply to an
injected agent — configure it on the agent). reqwest_client feeds the sync verbs and
reqwest_async_client the async ones — injecting only one and calling the other half just uses the
crate's per-call client for that half.
A fully custom transport also owns the job of classifying a non-2xx response. Prefer
Error::http_status_error_with_headers(status, url, &headers)
over the header-blind Error::http_status_error: the
header-blind form still maps a 429 to
Error::RateLimited -- the status alone is the signal. What it
cannot do is promote a 403 (with no headers in hand a 403 stays Unauthorized) or recover the
reset_at / retry_after fields, so rate_limit_delay() on one of its errors is always None.
See Rate limits and Error::RateLimited above for the full
classification rule. The built-in reqwest and ureq clients (including an injected ureq::Agent)
all use the header-aware form, so they classify identically.
fn update() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let client = self_update::reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
// .add_root_certificate(...) / .proxy(...) / .danger_accept_invalid_certs(...) etc.
.build()?;
self_update::backends::github::Update::configure()
.repo_owner("jaemk")
.repo_name("self_update")
.bin_name("github")
.current_version(self_update::cargo_crate_version!())
.reqwest_client(client)
.build()?
.update()?;
Ok(())
}Cross-compilation (cross / cargo-cross). rustls is the default TLS backend, so
no additional configuration is needed for cross-compilation: a build on default features
already uses rustls. If you have explicitly switched to native-tls and want to revert,
remove the native-tls feature; rustls is active by default.
TLS certificate errors on Linux (native-tls / OpenSSL). With the native-TLS backend,
OpenSSL finds the system CA bundle on its own on most distributions. In a minimal environment where
it can't (some containers, musl static builds, or a non-standard cert layout) a request may fail
with a certificate-verification error. Point OpenSSL at the bundle by exporting SSL_CERT_FILE
(and, if needed, SSL_CERT_DIR) before running your program — the paths vary by distribution, e.g.
on a Debian/Ubuntu base:
export SSL_CERT_FILE=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
export SSL_CERT_DIR=/etc/ssl/certsAlternatively build with the rustls feature, which uses a bundled root store and does not depend
on the system OpenSSL cert layout.
TLS certificate errors behind a corporate proxy (ureq + rustls). Many company networks
terminate outbound HTTPS at an intercepting proxy that re-signs traffic with an internal CA. That CA
is installed in the machine's trust store, so curl and the system browsers accept it, but the
ureq client's default root store is RootCerts::WebPki (Mozilla's bundled roots), which ignores the
machine entirely, so every request fails to verify. Enable the native-certs feature to move the
ureq client onto the OS trust store instead:
self_update = { version = "1.3", features = ["ureq", "rustls", "native-certs"] }The reqwest client needs nothing and is not affected by the feature: its rustls setup already
verifies through rustls-platform-verifier, and its native-tls setup uses the system store by
definition. On a reqwest-only build native-certs is a no-op that pulls in no extra dependency, so
it is safe to enable unconditionally in a crate that offers both clients.
native-certs has no effect on an injected ureq::Agent either, since that agent owns its own TLS
config, so set RootCerts::PlatformVerifier on it yourself. On Linux the OS trust store honors
SSL_CERT_FILE / SSL_CERT_DIR, so those env vars work as an escape hatch once the feature is on.
To trust exactly one internal CA and nothing else, skip the feature and pass the certificate to
add_root_certificate. Note that on
a ureq build that replaces the trust store rather than adding to it.
The proxy needs a username and password. HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY cover an unauthenticated
proxy, but if yours demands credentials, pass them on the builder with
proxy (see Proxies above) rather than
adding reqwest or ureq as a direct dependency just to build a client with a proxy on it.
License: MIT